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AVAILABILITY OF THE EX PARTE MOTION
IN LOUISIANA
In Louisiana, motions may be either oral or written, depend-
ing on whether they are made in open court.1 Since they are
considered a form of pleading when written they must con-
form to certain requirements. 2 The general provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure do not specify which motions can be
granted ex parte and which can be granted only after a con-
tradictory hearing. 4 Article 963 merely provides that an order
"to which the mover is clearly entitled without supporting proof"
may be granted ex parte. Although application of this provision
must raise questions in the minds of those dealing with it, little
litigation has resulted. All but one of the cases generated over
the issue of what can and cannot be done by an ex parte order
have been in the area of discovery. This Comment will discuss
the available jurisprudence and other materials which may be
helpful in providing some guidance in the application of the
Code's general test. To insure that the practical aspects of
this procedural problem would not be obscured by purely theoret-
ical concepts, the writer has made a serious effort to under-
stand the practical application by discussing the problem with
judges and practitioners.
1. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 961 (1960).
2. Id. art. 962. Under the federal rules motions are not considered as a
form of pleading. Id. at Preliminary Statement to bk. 2, tit. 1, ch. 4.
3. See Appendix for specific provisions for one method or the other.
4. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 963, comment (b) (1960): "Contradictory motions
are of two types. Usually, they are in the form of a 'rule to show cause ....
Less frequently, the contradictory motion is in the form of that used in
federal practice .... Under this article, either form . . . may be used, at
the option of the mover."
McMahon, Summary Procedure: A Comparative Study, 31 TUL. L. REV.
573, 586 n.50 (1957): "The Louisiana 'rule to show cause' is a hybrid, com-
mencing with a written motion by a party through counsel suggesting the
need or desirability of certain specified relief, and ending with a court order
requiring the adverse party to show cause on a date and hour designated
why the suggested relief should not be granted. . . . It is reasonable to
believe . . . that the Louisiana rule is an offspring of the common law
rule nisi with, except as noted hereinafter, this difference: In Louisiana
practice, the plaintiff in rule bears the burden of proving the facts sug-
gested in the rule and of satisfying the court of his right to the relief
suggested. The only Louisiana rules in which, as in the common law rule
nisi, the defendant in rule bears the burden of proof are those to test the
surety on a judicial bond, and to traverse a party's right to prosecute or
defend the action in forma pauperis. The fact that in these latter the per-
tinent facts are always peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant
probably accounts for this difference." Cf., generally, H. McMAHON, LOUISIANA




The decision which first explored the problem was Raia v.
WWL-TV. 5 In this defamation action defendants obtained an ex
parte discovery order under article 1492 of the Code of Civil
Procedure." Plaintiff's motion to quash the order with a rule to
show cause was overruled after a hearing. In the Supreme
Court plaintiff attacked both the original order and the over-
ruling of the motion to quash. He objected to the original order
on the grounds that the "good cause" requirement of article 1492
was not met and that such an order cannot be issued without
a contradictory hearing. Defendants urged that the circumstances
of the case and the nature of the documents sought supplied
"good cause," and that there is no legal requirement for a con-
tradictory hearing. Alternatively, defendants argued that "any
irregularity in the original order was cured by the hearing
on the motion to quash that order."7 One of the apparent diffi-
culties encountered by the Supreme Court was the absence of
a transcript from the trial court. The plaintiff alleged that
no evidence was taken at the contradictory hearing on the
motion to quash. The court answered by invoking the "well
recognized presumption that the judge a quo had before him
sufficient evidence and reasons to support the rulings complained
of."s
5. 247 La. 1095, 176 So.2d 390 (1965).
6. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1492 (1960): "Upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor, and subject to the provisions of Article 1452, the court
in which an action is pending or in which the judgment was originally
rendered may:
"(1) Order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copy-
ing or photographing by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any
of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Article
1436 and which are in his possession, custody, or control.
7. 247 La. 1095, 1099, 176 So.2d 390, 391 (1965).
8. Id.; cf. Clark v. Richardson, 157 So.2d 325 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), for
a collection of authorities.
This type situation will be encountered later. See text at note 33 infra.
It should operate as a caveat to the practitioner when there is any chance
that he may wish to appeal the ruling of the trial court. The problem
raised is mentioned by Justice Summers in his dissenting opinion to
Dugas v. Continental Cas. Co., 249 La. 843, 848, 191 So.2d 642, 644 (1966):
"And how is a reviewing court to measure the exercise of a trial court's
discretion where that discretion is not based upon any record evidence?
An order not supported by the record, in effect, denies the aggrieved party
the right of review on appeal, for it cannot be determined whether the
trial court has properly exercised its discretion without the evidence upon
which the evidence is founded."
The court in Mangrum v. Powell, 181 So.2d 400 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965),
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The court then adroitly avoided the issue of the need for
an initial contradictory hearing.
"Having found that there was a contradictory hearing on
the motion to quash anent the validity of the initial dis-
covery order which resulted in judgment maintaining it in
full force and effect, it becomes unnecessary for us to deter-
mine whether or not such order was properly obtained in
the first instance (on this question we do not now express
an opinion." 9
Continuing, the court said that this was "in keeping with our
decision in refusing an application for supervisory writs in
Ackermann v. Columbia Casualty Company et al."'10 In Acker-
mann the same procedure-"an ex parte discovery order having
been maintained by a judgment overruling a motion to quash
following a contradictory hearing on such motion"--had been
followed."
Justice Summers, dissenting, discussed the need for a show-
ing of "good cause" and for an adversary proceeding in the
initial stage. As to the former, he said that "the meager allega-
tion in the motion which formed the basis of the contested
ex parte order is fatal to its validity' 2 and that the plaintiff was
distinguishes the Raia case on this point. There, the trial court directed
by ex parte order the production of certain medical reports. Plaintiff sought
to quash the order in a contradictory hearing, but was overruled. Writs
were granted. No evidence was adduced at the hearing and the court
minutes merely note: "Motion to set aside the Order of Production of
Documents argued and motion overruled." Id. at 401. In distinguishing the
Raia case and setting aside the production order, the court said: "We
observe, however, that the case cited did not invoke application of the
limitations imposed upon LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1492 by the provisions of Article
1452. It was not contended in Raia that the data sought therein through
discovery means was affected by the limitations of Article 1452." Id. at 402.
9. 247 La. 1095, 1100, 176 So.2d 390, 392 (1965).
10. 247 La. 354, 170 So.2d 868 (1965).
11. 247 La. 1095, 1101, 176 So.2d 390, 392 (1965).
12. Id. at 1103, 176 So.2d at 39-3: "This good cause requirement is not a
mere formality, but is a plainly expressed limitation of that article. It is
not met by mere conclusory allegations (or no allegations as in this case)
of the pleadings-nor by mere relevance to the case-but requires an affir-
mative showing by the movant that each document, as to which examination
is sought, is really and genuinely needed and the purpose for which it is
sought is legitimate, or that good cause exists otherwise for ordering each
particular examination." Id. at 1105, 176 So.2d at 393. See Geolograph Serv.
Corp. v. Southern Pacific Co., 172 So.2d 128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), for addi-
tional interpretation of the good cause requirement, with particular em-
phasis on federal practice and interpretation. The court quashed an ex parte
discovery order because the good cause requirement, with particular
emphasis on federal practice and interpretation. The court quashed an
ex parte discovery because the good cause requirement had not been met.
1968] COMMENTS
entitled to have it set aside. As to the need for a contradictory
hearing, he asserted:
"Furthermore, an adversary proceeding is clearly required
by the code when it says: 'If the order applied for by writ-
ten motion is one to which the mover is not clearly entitled,
or which requires supporting proof, the motion shall be
served on and tried contradictorily with the adverse party.'
La. Code Civ. P. art. 963. I submit that in no instance, with-
out hearing the adverse party, is a mover 'clearly' entitled
to copy and examine documents of a litigant, his counsel or
witness." (Emphasis added.) 1 8
Against this background the remaining discovery cases can
be considered chronologically.
The Source Provisions
Lindsey v. Escude14 involved an ex parte order to report for
a physical examination issued pursuant to article 1493.15 The
court concluded that such an order is improper without the
contradictory hearing contemplated by the article.1 In his
opinion, Judge Tate discussed the specific language of the
article, its source provision and historical background in the
13. 247 La. 1095, 1106, 176 So.2d 390, 394 (1965).
14. 179 So.2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
15. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1493 (1960): "In an action in which the mental
or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which
the action is pending or in which the judgment was originally rendered
may order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
physician, except as otherwise provided by law. The order may be made
only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party to be
examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by
whom it is to be made."
16. Abshire v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 179 So.2d 508 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1965), is a companion case, an ex parte order requiring one to report
for a medical examination. The one distinguishing feature on which the
decision rested was that this order was issued pursuant to R.S. 23:1121 of
the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act. After mentioning the Lindsey
case and its result, the court says: "However, Article 1493 also provides
that the court may issue an order for medical examination under its terms
'except as otherwise provided by law.' This latter proviso was specifically
intended to leave undisturbed the provisions of the Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Act .... As we shall show, this excepting proviso was never-
theless not intended to eliminate the requirement of prior notice and an
opportunity to oppose the examination before the order is issued." Id. at
510. So the two cases are identical in result in that the orders were over-
ruled, but the Abshire case involved a different source article. Judge Hood
dissented, believing that the clause "except as otherwise provided by law"
in article 1493 was included to cover the situation at hand. And since R.S.
23:1123 contains no requirement for a contradictory hearing, an ex parte
order is sufficient.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a comparison of the language
of articles 1492 and 1493, and the general policy bases for the
interpretation rendered. An analysis of Judge Tate's approach
reveals an emphasis on the phrase "upon notice to the party
to be examined."
"[I]t cannot be interpreted to mean that such notice need
not be given until after the order is issued. Obviously, if a
statute did purport to authorize an ex parte order, such
an order could never be effective without notification of it
to the party ordered by it to submit to medical examination.
There would thus be no need for the code article to specify
that an order for medical examination could be issued only
'upon notice' if an ex parte order with notice only after it
were contemplated."'17
Because of the relative abundance of cases and treatises
interpreting the Federal Rules, Louisiana courts are relying on
them as a persuasive guide to the meaning of our code articles
whenever possible. Article 1493 tracks the language of Federal
Rule 35(a)18 under which a contradictory motion with notice
is required before an order is issued.19
Additional support for the position of the court is provided
by a comparison of the language of articles 149220 and 1493.
Article 1492 follows Federal Rule 3421 in providing for produc-
tion of documents and related items but contains a deletion
which was deemed most important by the court-the phrase
"upon notice" is not found in our article 1492 as it is in article
1493.
"We regard this deliberate change from the federal prac-
tice .. and the apparent deliberate retention of the federal
wording and practice as to LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1493 relating
to orders for medical examinations, as a plain indication
that the Law Institute and the Louisiana legislature intended
to preserve the federal practice that orders for medical
17. 179 So.2d 505, 506 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (1952).
19. W. BARRON & A. HOLTzOFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 822, at
480 (1961).
20. See note 6 supra.
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 34 (1952); 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 801, at 464 (1961): "An application for discovery and Inspec-
tion is made on motion. Notice of motion is required, as the adverse party
Is entitled to be heard on the question of whether the application should
be granted, and, if so, the extent and manner of discovery."
[Vol. XXVIII
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examinations be issued only after notice and an opportunity
to be heard in opposition to the order."22
In terms of general policy, the court mentioned that good
cause must be shown and that the "party to be examined should
be able to have the examination made at a time and place
without undue inconvenience to himself, as well as to oppose
examinations as unnecessary, painful, or hazardous. '23
Finally, the concept of sanctity of the person was cited. The
case of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 24 was mentioned as indicating
the hold which this principle has upon the feelings of our courts.
In that case the source provision of article 1493, Federal Rule
35(a), was upheld by a five to four vote. Troubling the dis-
senters was an apparent infringement upon the "inviolability of
the person" and the "liberties of the subject. '25 The more recent
case of Schlagenhauf v. Holder,26 in which the United States
Supreme Court emphasizes the need for a strong showing of
good cause when this discovery device is used, demonstrates that
these ideals have not been abandoned.
The Role of the Good Cause Requirement
In American Mark Distributing Corp. v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R.-" the court was faced with determining whether the
"good cause" requirement of article 1492 had been met.28 Some
of the language of the decision is pertinent to the present inquiry.
The lower court refused to set aside an order for the production
of documents; as to the need for additional proof in general, the
appellate court said:
"We think in certain instances good cause for the production
of a document might be deduced from the motion itself, if
discovery, which is procedural and remedial, is to be con-
strued liberally, as is proper."29
After reviewing the contents of one of the documents, the court
concluded that "because of its very nature, it was not necessary
22. 179 So.2d 505, 507 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
23. Id.
24. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
25. Id. at 17.
26. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
27. 180 So.2d 869 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
28. Cf. Geolograph Serv. Corp. v. Southern Pacific Co., 172 So.2d 128
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), for interpretation of good causes, with particular
emphasis on federal authorities.
29. 180 So.2d 869, 871 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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to show good cause."30 The order for production of the other
documents was set aside since there was neither a showing of
good cause nor of prejudice because of non-production. The court
concluded that the trial judge "was without any authority inso-
far as said items are concerned to grant the ex parte order of
production which was secured by simple motion. . . . No evi-
dence was taken on the presentation of the motion or on the
trial of the motion to recall the order of production. See Raia v.
WWLTV."
3 1
It is not over-emphasizing the words "insofar as said items
are concerned" to conclude that this court does not believe a con-
tradictory hearing is required in all instances. The exact signifi-
cance of the reference to the Raia case is not clear. Not having
read Raia, one would infer from the reference that it would be
authority for the proposition that an order for the production
of documents cannot be made when no record of evidence was
taken on the original order or the motion to quash. As we have
seen,3 2 this is not true. It is more likely that Raia was men-
tioned merely to indicate an awareness of that decision and the
implications it has raised.
The Supreme Court in Dugas v. Continental Cas. Co.3 denied
the writs of a party ordered to produce certain X-rays over
Justice Summers' dissent.3 4 In contrast to Raia and other cases
examined, the order was not made ex parte. Upon motion for
production, the trial court ordered the opposing party to show
cause why the X-rays should not be produced. Several objec-
tions were made to the motion for production.3 5 At the hearing
the trial judge _found that the mere allegation in the motion
would not satisfy the good cause requirement, but indicated that
an oral statement of defense counsel supplied the deficiency. It
was upon this point that Justice Summers dissented,3 6 placing
30. Id.
31. Id. at 872.
32. See note 9 supra.
33. 249 La. 763, 191 So.2d 141 (1966).
34. Id. at 843, 191 So.2d at 642.
35. There were three objections: that the X-rays were privileged, that
no good cause had been shown, and that although article 1492 authorizes
the court to order production and permit inspection and copying of evi-
dence, the court cannot require that possession of the evidence be surren-
dered.
36. 249 La. 843, 846, 191 So.2d 642, 643 (1966): "According to the applica-
tion before us and the trial judge's written reasons, no evidence was taken
at the hearing, and the order issued merely upon the conclusory allegation of
defendant's counsel contained in the written motion for production supple-
[Vol. XXVIII
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primary emphasis on federal authorities in discussing the good
cause requirement:
"[T]he trial judge in the case at bar issued a rule to show
cause, which, under my view, was required procedure in
this case. (However, as I shall point out, a formal hearing
may not be necessary in all cases.) See 2A Barron and Holt-
zoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, §§ 801 and 802.... As
I understand Article 1492, a formal hearing should usually
be held when the taking of testimony is required to estab-
lish good cause. On the other hand, when good cause may
be established by satisfactory documentary evidence alone,
the documents may be attached to the motion, making a
hearing unnecessary. A party aggrieved by the order to
produce may then move to set aside that order .... Only
in this manner do I feel that Article 1492 can be observed
and the fundamental rights of litigants preserved. Schlagen-
hauf v. Holder .... These several reasons dictate a more
rigid construction of the good cause requirement than has
been utilized in the instant case." (Emphasis added.)37
This is in contrast to his dissenting language in Raia v. WWL-
TV: 3 1
"I submit that in no instance, without hearing the adverse
party, is a mover 'clearly' entitled to copy and examine
documents of a litigant, his counsel or witness."3 9
Perhaps one can reconcile the conflicting language by placing
emphasis upon the phrase "formal hearing" or by distinguishing
the cases on the basis that one dealt with the production of
X-rays and the other with certain published statements. It is
submitted that no attempt should be made to distinguish the
two cases because the later expression reflects further investiga-
tion and contemplation resulting in a more realistic approach.
It will be noted that the guideline set forth above as to
when a hearing is necessary is actually a restatement of the
article 963 test.40 A mover is not entitled to production unless
mented by counsel's oral statement to the trial judge at the hearing on
the rule. Based upon this understanding, it is my opinion that it was
error to deny certiorari."
37. Id. at 847-49, 191 So.2d at 643-44.
38. 247 La. 1095, 176 So.2d 390 (1965).
39. Id. at 1106, 176 So.2d at 394.
40. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 963 (1960): "If the order applied for by written
motion is one to which mover Is clearly entitled without supporting proof,
the court may grant the order ex parte and without hearing the adverse
party. ... "
1968]
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good cause is shown; therefore, when good cause is shown, he
may be "clearly entitled" to the order. The "without supporting
proof" of article 963 is interpreted to mean testimony.
It appears that the better rule is not to require a contra-
dictory hearing upon every discovery motion under article 1492.
Such a requirement would appeal to those dissatisfied with the
manner in which some courts have interpreted good cause and
administered the discovery practice in general. However, there
is a point at which practicality must prevail,41 and discovery
procedure would have to shoulder an onerous burden if formal
hearings were required upon every motion.
Discovery Orders
The administration of discovery orders varies across the state.
No courts have been found which refuse to grant ex parte dis-
covery orders under any circumstances. Unfortunately, however,
there are courts which follow the extreme practice of signing
orders of every description without reading a single item in the
motion.42 In jurisdictions where this is true, it is then up to the
party against whom the order has been issued to rule the mover
into court and bear the burden of upsetting the order. In the
words of Justice Summers, this practice "shifts the burden from
the party seeking production, where the burden squarely rests
under Article 1492, to the shoulders of the party against whom
production is sought-an obvious departure from fundamental
standards of fairness.' 4 3 What this does, in effect, is to use the
"clearly entitled to" test after the fact. A device which enables
41. In addition, consider the interpretation of article 1492 by the court
in Lindsey v. Escud6, 179 So.2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), at text accom-
panying notes 20 and 21 supra.
42. This appears deplorable. This view was reinforced after several
instances of great abuse were revealed. Certainly, no judge is so busy
that he cannot spare a moment at least to scan the order. "Justice delayed
is justice denied" can be carried to the extreme. From a federal court, we
find this view: Ordering of discovery and production of documents and
things under Rule 34 is, in the last analysis, discretionary with the court,
and whether good cause exists for such order lies in the sound discretion
of the court. But "the Rule contemplates an exercise of judgment by the
court, not a mere automatic granting of the motion." (Emphasis added.)
Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 170 F.2d 811, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
43. Dugas v. Continental Cas. Co., 249 La. 843, 848, 191 So.2d 642, 644
(1966): "The burden of showing materiality of the information and ability
to produce it rests on the one seeking discovery." Van Der Heydt v. Rogers,
251 F.2d 17, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1958): "It is not enough to say that production
should be allowed unless the court is satisfied under the circumstances of
the case that the administration of justice would be impeded by such
production. Rule 34 requires an affirmative showing of good cause." J. MOORE,
MANUAL-FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 15.06(4), at 1174 (1967).
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one to invade another's privacy demands the best in administra-
tive practices. The party desiring a change in the status quo
should bear the burden.
Hopefully this practice is not widespread and a more equi-
table approach is employed. It would be better, for example, to
establish the precise need for production and to ascertain whether
there has been a good faith attempt by the mover to communi-
cate with opposing counsel. If satisfied that the requirements of
production have been met, the court would then issue the order,
giving the party against whom it has been issued ample time
to file a motion to quash. In this age of rapid communication
it is not unreasonable to require the mover to make an honest
effort to contact opposing counsel, if he be known.44 Our liberal
rules of pleading and discovery have been designed to remove
any atmosphere of secrecy from the courtroom. In addition, it
must be borne in mind that full disclosure, or the lack thereof,
and discovery are two-edged swords, and the possibility of reci-
procity should prompt cooperation.
Other Areas
Aside from discovery, one other case directly meets the
issue of what can and cannot be done by way of an ex parte
motion. In Stevens v. Babineaux45 plaintiff obtained a prelimi-
nary judgment for workmen's compensation because defendant
had failed to file an answer or other pleading within ten days
after service of citation, as required by R.S. 23:1315-1316. Ap-
proximately two months later defendant filed an ex parte "Motion
to Dismiss Preliminary Judgment," alleging that it had been
improperly issued. Pursuant to this motion the trial court entered
an order annulling and setting aside the preliminary judgment,
without notice to plaintiff or a hearing. In fact, plaintiff did
not even know of the order until informed of it in a letter from
defense counsel, written in answer to a request for payment of
the amount due under the preliminary judgment. The reviewing
court correctly set aside the order dismissing the preliminary
judgment because it was not "one to which the mover is clearly
entitled." In the words of the court:
"It was a motion asking for the annulment of a judgment
to pay money, as to which there are very serious questions
44. If opposing counsel is one who does not return calls, he should
have no reason to object to the procedure followed.
45. 196 So.2d 668 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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of both law and fact. The motion should have been served
on the plaintiff and tried contradictorily with him.
46
The phrase "serious questions of both law and fact" should
not be taken as an inflexible rule to be applied in every situa-
tion, but a good indication of the type of inquiry the court
should make before granting an ex parte motion. Certainly,
in such a case the mover is not "clearly entitled" to the order
sought.
Other Jurisdictions
As the discussion above indicates, the courts of our state
have not often faced the ex parte motion issue, and the Supreme
Court has yet to specifically answer when such an order may be
granted. A brief look at the situation which exists in a number
of other jurisdictions follows.
Since our system of civil procedure is patterned to some
extent after the federal system, it should be helpful to consult
the Federal Rules to determine when an ex parte motion is
permitted.47 Under the Federal Rules the distinction between
ex parte and "notice"48 motions is important in that written ex
parte motions need not be served.
4 9
Despite the absence of helpful jurisprudence in the area,50
some guidelines may nevertheless be gleaned from federal courts
and authorities. A perusal of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure reveals several provisions for ex parte motions which may
be helpful.51 The case of Lindsey v. Escude, 2 offers an example
46. Id. at 669.
47. Geolograph Serv. Corp. v. Southern Pacific Co., 172 So.2d 128, 129
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965): In general, federal cases "are not controlling
but they are persuasive in view of the fact that Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were promulgated long before the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
went into effect."
48. United States v. Rollnick, 33 F. Supp. 863, 865 (M.D. Pa. 1940):
"[Since the effective date of the New Rules of Civil Procedure, rules to
show cause have not been properly a part of civil practice. Rule 7(b)
provides that all applications to the court for orders shall be by motion.
The rules and forms clearly indicate that motions are brought before the
court by means of a 'notice of motion' which serves the purpose of a rule
to show cause and obviates the necessity for obtaining such a rule." Although
the above statement is true generally, there are certain instances in which
a rule to show cause is proper or required. E.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 2243 (1952),
providing for habeas corpus proceedings.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a).
50. See note 21 supra.
51. E.g., see FED. R. CIrv. P. 6(b) (extension of time); 6(d) (fix a different
time for service of a written motion); 26(a) (leave to take depositions);
33 (leave to take interrogatories); 65(b) (temporary restraining order); and
38(b) (demand for jury trial).
52. 179 So.2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
[Vol. XXVIII
COMMENTS
of Louisiana courts examining federal source provisions. The
fact that the federal rules do not permit an ex parte order for
a medical examination 53 apparently played an important role
in the outcome of that decision.
In other jurisdictions one finds a similar paucity of guide-
lines. The Nevada Supreme Court, speaking in very broad terms,
has said:
"Ex parte motions, that is, motions without notice, are of
various kinds and are frequently . . . permissible in proce-
dural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances
of emergency, as in the case of an application for an injunc-
tion to prevent irreparable injury which would result from
delay, and where there is no speedy and adequate remedy
at law.' '5 4
The court has not attempted to indicate when an ex parte motion
of a general nature is permissible. It is noteworthy that it
mentions the irreparable injury test-the same approach used
by our Code in article 3603,5 with regard to temporary restrain-
ing orders. Because of its limited use as outlined in the appli-
cable provisions, that test should not be used in any situations
other than are specifically provided for. Texas cases offer no
help in determining proper use of the ex parte motion.56 In
New York, where civil practice is a rather highly developed
art, one finds this comment to one of their code articles:
"What motions may be made ex parte is a question that
keeps recurring. The answer is not supplied in all cases by
statutory provision. In the absence of express statutory pro-
vision requiring notice, it has been said that the real test is
whether the adverse party is to be affected by the order."
(Emphasis added.) 57
It seems obvious that the test mentioned above is generally
unworkable because in very few instances can an order be said
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
54. Farnow v. Department 1 of Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 64 Nev.
109, 178 P.2d 371 (1947).
55. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3603 (1960): "A temporary restraining order
shall be granted without notice when it clearly appears from specific facts
shown by a verified petition or by supporting affidavit that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice
can be served and a hearing had . . .
56. 39 TEx. Jur. 2d Motions and Orders § 1, at 243-69 (1962).
57. 7B MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANN. § 2217, at
37 (1963).
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not to affect the other party. Where the other party is Vlearly
unaffected, however, the rule of our Code more than adequately
covers the situation by permitting issuance of the order.
Louisiana, therefore, is not out of line with other jurisdic-
tions. 5 In fact we may be in a somewhat superior position
because our Code at least makes a general attempt to formulate
some type of test.
OBSERVATIONS
The failure of the bench to formulate guidelines based
upon article 963 is understandable. One factor adversely affect-
ing guideline formulation is the role that tradition and habit
play in the practice of law. Practitioners are usually before
judges whose attitudes toward the granting of ex parte orders
are firmly established. When a new judge is developing his
attitudes toward the subject, he is more likely to be conserva-
tive and little abuse of discretion is therefore found. Conse-
quently, no cases are taken up for review. If the judge develops a
liberal attitude and grants ex parte orders freely, practitioners
are likely to become wary and take any precautions available to
keep from being injured. Also, certain members of the bar will
gain the reputation for taking advantage of the liberal practice
and the remainder will be on guard against such acts. If a
stranger enters the jurisdiction and has an unfortunate experi-
ence because of the local practice with which he is unfamiliar,
he will probably regard it as an inevitable event.
A second factor discouraging concrete guidelines is the judi-
ciary's able administration of motion practice. If there were
widespread abuse of the trial judge's discretion the appellate
decisions would reflect it.
A third factor is the general good faith of the bar as a
whole. Although some members take advantage of loose adminis-
trative practices it is a credit to the legal profession that such
practice is not more widespread.
However, the most important factor seems to be that an
imprudently issued order can be challenged in the vast majority
of the cases by a rule on the motion to quash. No doubt many
attorneys tire of filing rules to show cause and carrying the
58. See Rodda, Ex Parte Matters Relating to the Pleadings, 41 Los
ANGELES B. BULL. 31, 41 (1965), for a discussion of matters peculiar to Cali-
fornia pleading.
COMMENTS
burden which rightly belongs on the other party, but seldom
will there be a need to resort to application for supervisory
writs.
CONCLUSION
Despite the lack of express statutory or jurisprudential
guidelines, the Code of Civil Procedure itself may provide some
guidance. By using a technique similar to that employed in
Lindsey,59 one can analyze the subject covered by the order in
question to compare it with a subject for which a code article
specifically provides either an ex parte order or a contradictory
hearing as appropriate. In an appendix to this article a list of the
various provisions which may be used in this process is pro-
vided. An inspection of some of the articles will reveal that
neither the words "ex parte" nor "contradictory hearing" are
present.60 Following the reasoning of Lindsey v. Escude,61 those
which are worded "upon motion and notice" have been inter-
preted to require a contradictory hearing. The phrase "the
court on its own motion or motion of an interested party"62 is
believed to indicate that an ex parte order is appropriate.
Although no hard and fast rule for applying the test of article
963 has been derived, the following approaches are suggested.
(1) If the issue involves discovery, the cases discussed, 3
as well as the federal materials, can furnish some guidance.
(2) Any test similar to that required for a temporary
restraining order 4 would seem inappropriate outside the strict
confines for which it was developed.
(3) Finally, whenever possible the issue at hand should be
compared to a situation in the Code for which the proper
approach is specifically set forth.
Edwin C. Schilling III
59. Lindsey v. EscudiG, 179 So.2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See text
at note 20 supra.
60. E.g., see note 15 supra.
61. 179 So.2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See text accompanying note
22 supra.
62. E.g., LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 192 (1960): "A trial court, on its own motion
or on motion of a party, may appoint persons learned or skilled in a science,
art, profession, or calling as experts .... "
63. Raia v. WWL-TV, 247 La. 1095, 176 So.2d 390 (1965); Dugas v.
Continental Cas. Co., 249 La. 763, 191 So.2d 141 (1966); Lindsey v. Escud6,
179 So.2d 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); American Mark Distributing Corp. v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 180 So.2d 869 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
64. See note 55 supra.
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122*1 Change of venue
595* Requiring plaintiff to provide security for costs
964* Motion to strike
1452 Orders for protection of parties and deponents
1493 Physical and mental examination of parties2
1495 Right of party examined to other medical reports (when objection
raised)
1951 Amendment of judgments
1971* Granting new trial
1972* Peremptory grounds for new trial
2296* Reduction of excessive seizure under writ of fieri facias
2377* To have inferior creditors' claims referred to proceeds of judicial
sale
2413* Effect of garnishee's failure to answer 4
2414* Creditor's motion to traverse answer of garnishee
2502* Writ of distringas5
3006* Absent heir's opposition to sending heirs present into possession
without an administration of the succession
3007* Creditor may demand security when heirs sent into possession
3135* Traversal of proc s verbal of public inventoryc
3137* Traversal of descriptive list of succession property
3182* Removal of succession representative7
1. * indicates that the article actually says "by contradictory hearing" or
"rule to show cause," or similar language.
2. Following the interpretation of Lindsey v. Escud6, 179 So.2d 505 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965).
3. LA. CODE Cxv. P. art. 1951, comment (e) (1960): "The above article
follows Fed. Rule 60(a) in providing for notice at the discretion of the court.
Art. 547 of the 1870 Code does not contain a similar provision. However, it
has been held that there is no error in correcting the name of a defendant,
erroneously described, without citing him to show cause why the correction
should not be made, where the error was of little or no importance. Town
of Mandeville v. Paquette, 153 La. 33, 95 So. 391 (1922). A contradictory
motion is required, however, to amend judgments giving incorrect descrip-
tion of realty. Jackson v. Brewster, 169 So. 166 (La. App. 1936); cf. Succes-
sion of Corrigan, 42 La. Ann. 65, 7 So. 74 (1890) ....
4. Id. art. 2413, comment (a): "This article changes the rule announced
in Winnfield Furniture Company v. Peyton, 171 La. 519, 131 So. 657 (1930),
authorizing the seizing creditor to obtain a judgment pro confesso against
the garnishee by ex parte motion, by requiring a contradictory motion be-
fore judgment may be rendered against him."
5. Id. art. 2502, comment (c): "Art. 636, Code of Practice of 1870, pro-
vides that the writ issues 'on motion' of the judgment creditor, but does
not indicate whether the proceedings are ex parte or contradictory with
the judgment debtor. In accordance with the accepted practice, this article
requires a contradictory motion or rule to show cause. .. "
6. Id. art. 3135, comment (b): "Although in many cases the inventory
is 'approved and homologated' by the court ex parte, there is no statute
or jurisprudential rule which either requires or gives effect to such homolo-
gation . .. .
7. Throughout this appendix the language "the court on its own motion
or on motion of any interested party" has been interpreted to mean an
ex parte proceeding is appropriate. However, this article specifically pro-
vides for a rule to show cause.
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3321* Interim allowance for maintenance during administration
3361" Sending heirs into possession after homologation of final tableau
of distribution (intestate succession)
3362* Sending heirs into possession prior to homologation of final tab-
leau of distribution (intestate succession) 8
3371* Sending legatee into possession after homologation of final tab-
leau of distribution (testate succession)
3372* Sending legatee into possession prior to homologation of final
tableau of distribution (testate succession)
3381* Judgment of possession
3394* Refusal or inability to accept funds on part of heir or creditor
of succession
3505* Reduction of excessive seizure under writ of attachment or se-
questration
3506* Dissolution of writ of attachment or sequestration
3544 Plaintiff's security for issuance of writ of attachment 9
3602 Preliminary injunction
3607 Dissolution or modification of temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction
3992* Consent of parent or tutor for judicial emancipation
4069* Separate tutor for property (when motion is made by one not
tutor nor entitled to be tutor)
4234* Removal of tutor
46090 Homologation of partition
46230 Partition when co-owner an absentee
4731* Eviction
5123* Testing sufficiency and validity of judicial bond
5184* Traversal of affidavits of property in action in forma pauperis
EX PARTE MOTION AVAILABLE
Article Subject
154 Recusation of district court judge
159 Recusation of supreme court justice
160 Recusation of judge of court of appeal
192 Authority of trial court to appoint experts
282 Acts which may be done by district court clerk
283 Orders and judgments which may be signed by district court
clerk
464 Change of venue when cumulation is improper
465 Separate trials of cumulated actions
531 Suits pending in Louisiana court or courts
532 Suits pending in Louisiana and federal or foreign court
561**1o Abandonment In trial and appellate court
8. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3362, comment (b) (1960): "However, since an
administrator has been appointed to represent creditors, the heirs are not
sent into possession ex parte but only in a proceeding contradictory with
the administrator, who may show to the satisfaction of the court that the
heirs should not be sent into possession or that they should be compelled
to furnish security . .. ."
9. Id. art. 3544, comment (b): "The phrase 'on proper showing' is taken
from Art. 245 of the Code of Practice and contemplates a contradictory pro-
ceeding .. "
10. "*indicates that the article specifically provides for an ex parte
motion.
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801** Voluntary substitution for deceased party
802*1 Compulsory substitution for deceased party
1154 Amendment to conform to evidence
1293 Service by private person
1354 Subpoena duces tecum"l
1492 Discovery and production of documents and things for inspection,
copying, or photographing12
1495 Right of party examined to other medical reports (if no objection)
1601 Discretionary grounds for continuance's
1671 Voluntary dismissal
1672 Involuntary dismissal
1951 Amendment of judgment14
2121 Method of appealing
2453** Judgment debtor examination
2881*1 Probate of testament (if no objection)
2889** Taking of depositions for probate matters
3001"* Putting into possession heirs and spouse of intestate
3004** Discretionary power to put heirs and spouse of intestate into
possession
3031** Sending legatees into possession
3082 Confirmation of executor
3083 Appointment of dative testamentary executor
3111 Appointment of provisional administrator
3137"* Amendment of descriptive list of succession property
3155** Creditor may compel executor to furnish security
3181 Revocation of appointment or confirmation of succession represen-
tative (if no qualification within ten days)
3225** Continuation of business under succession representative
3331 Filing of account by succession representative
4069 Separate tutor of property (if motion is made by tutor or person
entitled to tutorship)
4549 Appointment of provisional curator
4657** Limitation of time in which to answer In concursus proceedings
5091"* Appointment of attorney to represent certain persons
5183** Application for action in forma pauperis
11. United States v. J. Slotnik, 3 F.R.D. 408, 409 (D. Conn. 1944). The
following language with regard to Federal Rule 45, the source provision of
article 1354, is pertinent: "Merely because Rule 34 conditions the production
of documents by the party upon a motion after notice it does not follow
that Rule 45, providing for subpoenas to witnesses who may or may not
be parties, contemplates that the writ shall issue only after notice. Instead,
it is more plausible to believe that the express provision of Rule 45(b) for
motions to quash the subpoena was intended as a substitute rather than an
auxiliary safeguard for the advance notice required under Rule 34 ...
But the subpoena necessarily issues in advance of a stated return date and
the intervening period generally furnishes opportunity to present a motion
to quash if grounds exist therefor."
12. Following the reasoning of Lindsey v. Escud6, 179 So.2d 505 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965).
13. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1605, comment (1960): "Although as a practical
matter many continuances are granted ex parte by the court, the above
article provides an opportunity for controverting the application."
14. See note 3 this appendix supra.
